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1. THE BROAD BACKGROUND : CYCLES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
Most observers of South Africa and thinking South Africans have a 
broad notion that the inequality between black and trtiite 1n the 
society and poor conditions in black communities make South Africa 
vulnerable to massive Instability. There have always been pre-
dictions of revolution, or of instability in the offing, and these 
loose predictions continue. 
Vet, by world standards, South Africa has not been a particularly 
unstable country. Most of the assessments of business risk Bade 
by international organisations, for example, place South Africa 
among the twenty More riskfree countries in the world, at least 
1n the short to tedium tens. 
The past few decades have been characterised by the following 
broad patterns. After the second world war up to the middle 
fifties, South Africa was a very well-controlled system with 
blacks very quiescent, although in a far worse material position 
relative to whites than today. In the late forties, however, 
radical pressures e»erged in the then legal ANC.^ Leadership 
up to then had adopted a basically moderate, Christian stance 
of moral pressure. Boycott resolutions by the youth wing of 
the PNC led to the adoption of a "programs of action" in 1949, 
followed 1n 1951/52 by the well-known "Defiance Campaign" of the 
fifties, coanitted to the mobilisation of blacks through mass 
action of strikes, boycotts, demonstrations and general non-
collaboration. An alliance between the ANC, the South African 
Indian Congress, the South African Coloured Peoples Organisation 
and the S.A. Congress of Democrats, many of whose members were 
former members of the Corrmunist Party, resulted in political 
1) For an account of the political developments among blacks 
•ee Gail Gerhardt, Black PoDer in South Afrioa, Berkeley: 
University of California Pre?s, 1978, and Peter Walshe, 
The Rise of African Sationalim in South Africa, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971. 
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thinking among black leaders acquiring a much more radical ideological 
flavour than previously. 
Uhen the more youthful Africanlsts in the ANC broke away in 1958 to 
forn the Pan African Congress an even more clearly militant and 
confrontationst leadership emerged among blacks. These developments 
culminated in what was South Africa's first taste of widespread overt 
political action from blacks. ^  In the late fifties there were 
stonings of buses and beerhalls, limited marches or demonstrations 
in the major cities, but the calls for stay-at-home strikes were 
generally only partly successful. Where developments appeared 
dangerous, the authorities quelled the action with determined 
counteraction and arrests. Still the resistance mounted and 
finally 1t reached a peak in March and April of 1960, the time of the 
Sharpevilie'killings. 
The PAC had prepared for massive nation-wide action, but strictly 
along the lines of passive resistance. The participation of less-
organised youthful elements made the situation unpredictable. 
While most of the Witwatersrand was quiet, there were massive 
encounters with the police 1n Cape Town, the Southern Witwatersrand, 
where the Sharpevilie Incident occurred, and 1n Durban. Elsewhere 
thousands burned their passes, even in Bloemfontein - a city where 
blacks had seemed to be particularly passive. A march of 15 000 
people to the centre of Cape Town, where the strikes were also 
wel 1-supported, was perhaps the most threatening to whites. 
After a short period of uncertainty, the reaction of the authorities 
was decisive. An emergency was declared and over 18 000 people were 
arrested - over 25 percent of the 70 000 formal membership of the PAC 
and ANC combined. 
There had been serious but localised uprisings before that, such 
a* the Bondelzvarts and Bulhoek rebellions. -
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New legislation was passed to control dissidence and the ANC and 
the PAC were banned. Subsequent calls by the underground ANC for 
stay-at-hosse strikes were largely Ignored and blacks started queuing 
to replace their burned passes. As Gail Gerhardt observes, "The 
muth that the Afrioan masses were a volcano on the verge of an 
explosion had itself been exploded". Two wjor lessons were 
learned: firstly, the mass of black people were not prepared to 
risk their security and meagre privileges in any active political 
engagement of the authorities, and secondly, the South African 
state was easily able to control and repress the most determined 
public dissldence from the radical wings of black society. 
Following the emergency of 1961, there were some 200 incidents of 
underground action and insurgency up to the end of 1964, but the 
police steadily tracked down and destroyed the underground for-
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•ations ^sponsible. ' 
A period of quiet followed over the r^st of the sixties and early 
seventies. From 1968 onward, however, a new political consciousness 
began to take form - Black Consciousness. Originating 1n the United 
States (although with Africanist roots) the movement first gained 
•omentum among black theology students and anong a black student 
jjroup trfilch broke away from the dooinantly white student organisation, 
NUSAS. A movement dedicated to all black (i.e. non-white) solidarity, 
.by the mid-seventies had produced a fair number of strongly ideological 
organisations, including the South African Students Organisation 
(SASO) and Black Peoples Convention (BPC). The political culture 
of black solidarity and the spirit of independence from, and in part, 
hostility towards whites held sway over black students and high 
school leadership groups. From 1972 onwards, there were nunerous 
demonstrations and boycotts on black campuses throughout the 
country. These tactics established a new pattern of open'conflict, 
which was soon to spread outside the campuses. 
1) Gail Gerhardt, op.cit, p.251. 
See Muriel Horrel, Action, Reaction and Counter-reaction, 
Johannesburg : S.A. Institute of Race Relations, 1971. 
In 1976, black and Coloured educational facilities were becoming 
increasingly over-stressed as a result of the rapid rise In pupil 
number's. The Independence of the Transkel created Insecurity in 
regarfl to citizenship status among the very prominent Xhosa-
speaking youth leadership on the Wltwatersrand. Growth rates In 
the economy of 2 percent In 1975 and 1976 (compared with 71 In 
1974) produced a spurt 1n black youth unemployment. The imposition 
of Afrikaans as a mediut of instruction, despite well-backed warnings 
from parent-teachers organisations and the South African Institute of 
Race Relations, created critical anxieties among pupils under stress. 
This final frustration, against a background of youth political 
solidarity and mobilised consciousness, resulted in the June, 1976 
youth uprisings on the Witwatersrand, which spread to over 160 
communities 1n other parts of the Transvaal, to Coloured and 
Indian pupfls, to university students and even to the Inkatha-
dominated Natal township of KwaMashu, although the scope was very 
limited there.1> 
These youth uprisings on occasion led to marches by tens of thousands 
on Johannesburg and into the centre of Cape Town, where large-scale 
confrontations with the police occurred. Several calls for sympathy 
stay-away strikes by adult workers were made. The first was partly 
successful because of coercion by the demonstrator^, the second and 
particularly the third gained the co-operation of adult workers 1n 
Johannesburg and were 50 to 70 percent successful. Later calls for 
strikes were unsuccessful because of a tougher attitude to absenteeism 
among employers. The disturbances claimed the lives of 575 people 
(137 in Cape Town, the rest mainly on the Witwatersrand) with an 
additional 3 900 people injured. The police made nearly 6 000 
arrests over the period. 
For an account of these disturbances see Report of the 
Camtiaeicm of Enquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Elsewhere 
from June 161 1976 to February 28, 1977 (Cillie Cormission), 
Government Printer, 1980, and John Kane-Berman, Somto, Black. 
Revolt, White Reaction, Johannesburg : Ravan Press, 1978. 
The disturbances may not have started as a manifestly political 
event, but after the first clashes with the police, soon took on 
a markedly rhetorical political flavour. There was clearly 
organised leadership by students' councils and for a while their 
leadership was readily replaced after arrests. The focus of 
violence was generally state property and Institutions like liquor 
stores which the students claimed weakened the political will of 
the black people. 
Perhaps the most important consequence was that many hundreds, 1f 
not thousands, of young people fled the country. In June, 1978 
the Chief of the Security Police estimated that some 4 000 black 
South Africans were undergoing Insurgency training abroad, and 
that he expected the number to Increase steadily as a result of 
the "Soveto" uprisings. 
"These disturbances continued,with brea'ks.into 1979 particularly 1n 
the Cape. In 1980 toere were once again outbreaks of boycotts 
and demonstrations among school-going youth, with hundreds of 
arrests and some violent confrontations with police. The school 
boycotts In 1980 1n Natal brought the youthful demonstrators Into 
conflict with lnkatha, the mass black organisation under the 
leadership of Chief Buthelezi. The restlessness among black 
youth subsided during 1981, with the exception of ongoing tensions 
on black university campuses. The scene today is comparatively 
calm. 
In taking stock of the situation, 1t seems that as 1n the early 
sixties, the black political protest from 1976 onward was no 
match for the controlling power of the state. Indeed, the police 
were able to cope relatively easily and the arrny did not have to 
become involved 1n any significant way. 
It Is Important to consider to what extent general support from the 
mass of black adults existed during the disturbances. Hanf and 
his team from the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute found in sample 
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surveys that overall, 57 percent of urban blacks declared themselves 
to be in sympathy with the Soweto disturbances. While less well-
educated workers outside Soweto generally condemned the disturbances 
(less'than 30 percent were in favour), in Soweto itself, even among 
the lower working class, 62 percent sympathised with the radical 
youth. ^ Sympathy, however, does not necessarily imply any 
likelihood of physical support. It is worth noting, however, that 
not all the participants in the Soweto disturbances were youths. 
The S.A. Institute of Race Relations estimated that roughly one-
third of casualties among the demonstrators were over 26 years of 
We have seen that some support from workers was forthcoming during 
the second and third calls for mass strikes. This support does 
not appear to have been very committed, however, since when the 
authorities warned the strikers by means of pamphlets, and employers 
threatened to disaiss people who were absent, the support for the 
demonstrators seemed to evaporate. 
There was a quite considerable response to calls by the demonstrators 
for a boycott of trfiite shops in Johannesburg. The Furniture Traders 
Association reported a 40 percent decline in Christmas sales in 1976, 
largely as a result of political "agitation". This was short-lived, 
however, and trading soon returned to normal. In Soweto the young 
peoples' organisation of a demonstration against rent increases in 
1976 won them considerable sympathy, but the mass of black adults 
remained judiciously uninvolved. 
It is clear then, that the much feared escalation of mass black 
Political action did not occur, white lives and property were never 
in danger, and the loss of life, although substantial and tragic, 
never looked like becoming a bloodbath. Furthermore, serious 
divisions in black political responses were revealed once again 
See, Theodor Hanf et al. Sudafrihi: Friedlicher Vandel? 
Kinchen/Hain*: Kaieer-Griinevald, 1978, p.335-336. 
2 ) See al«o Kane-Berman, op^cit* Chapter 1. 
since 1n Soweto, Cape Town and Durban, there were Instances of 
violent migrant worker action against the more radical youth. 
Two Government Cabinet Ministers were able to claim in late 1976 
that only 20 percent or less of Soweto had in any way shown them-
selves to be active supporters of the disturbances.1^ This, of 
course, did not take account of widespread hidden sympathies 
revealed by the attitude research quoted above, but is probably 
a fair reflection of active and committed support among adults. 
At the present time, the situation once more is fairly quiescent. 
Confrontation of the police is ongoing but isolated and sporadic 
(just before the time of writing a fairly limited' disturbance 
occurred In Sobantu In Pieteroaritzburg). Me have seen, then, 
that two waves of active political resistance have built up since 
the second world war, neither of which fundamentally threatened 
the security of the state. Both waves of action revealed a 
failure to actively mobilise the majority of black adults. Is 
this history, which has been very briefly outlined, a cause for 
complacency among whites and the South African government? Me 
turn to this issue below. 
THE CONDITIONS FOR STABILITY OR VIOLENCE 
In order to assess the likelihood of instability, we have to consider 
the mix of factors which have related to revolution and rebellion in 
other societies. -Much speculation exists as regards the factors 
producing revolution, but some rigorous attempts to systematise the 
causal factors have been carried out. It is clear from virtually 
all analyses that rebellion or instability is virtually never the 
result of simple deprivation, poverty or inequality. 
» 
Ted 6urr has attempted what is perhaps the most comprehensive analysi 
1) John Kane-Berman, op,cit$ p.6. 
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of the preconditions and conditions for political violence.1^ 
After surveying very many situations of rebellion comparatively, he 
formulates his hypothesis as follows (the terminology and relations 
between variables are selected and simplified for presentation 1n 
this paper): the magnitude of political violence, results from 
relat ive deprivation, acting as an Independent factor, and from 
relative deprivation in interaction with moral and utilitarian 
justifications for violence, and the balance between the capacity 
of the dissidents and the authorities to coerce and organise. 
In this explanation, relative deprivation has a double effect, 
both independently as a factor and in coninned effect with other 
factors. Relative deprivation creates the discontent crucial to 
political violence. 
Relative dep'rivation can be defined as the discrepancy between peoples' 
perception of the goods and conditions to which they are rightfully 
entitled, and their perception of the goods and conditions they think 
th$y are capable of achieving and keeping. Hence, discontent is 
not the result of the difference between what men want and what they 
have, but between what they want and what they believe they will be 
able to get within the systew. Discontent is muted if men believe 
that they could work to achieve their wants. 
The expectations and the hope of attaining them, as related to 
. relati ve deprivation are increased by 
1. the stimulation of new wants, 
2. successes which other comparable social groups may be attaining, 
3. a low level of gratification relative to other groups, particularly 
of rewards or conditions which are crucial to attaining other 
rewards of value, (like education, for example), 
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton : Princeton University 
Press, 1970; and Ted Gurr and Raymand Duvall, "Civil Conflicts 
w the 1960'e", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 6, July, 
1973. 
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4. a perception that the system is inflexible 1n allocating 
rewards; limitations on the range of ways 1n vrtiich im-
provements can be gained, 
5. an experience of Improvements in the past, 
6. an experience of deterioration 1n current conditions, 
7. limitation on the range of options open for the attainment of 
Improvements. These factors will increase the intensity of 
relative deprivation. 
8. If the relative deprivation is felt across a comprehensive 
range of salient life concerns over a long period, the 
intensity will also Increase. 
9. If Intensely felt relative deprivation across a comprehensive 
range of life concerns is present among large proportions of a 
collectivity; I.e. many people sharing overlapping experiences 
of deprivation, then a potential for collective violence is 
created. 
These factors are the "psychological" variables, Wiich determine how 
individuals, collectively perceive their circumstances and the 
environment. To them we must add the group-related sociological 
variables that exist in the groups' situation as an entity. 
These are: 
10. the extent to which the political culture of the groups stamps 
the situation as Illegitimate or immoral and therefore justifies 
violence (normative justifications), 
11. the extent to which the group develops a collective belief that 
violence will have practical benefits (utilitarian justification 
for violence), 
12. the extent to which the dissidents have stocks of rewards which 
can be used to encourage violence and support for dissidence, 
13. the extent to which the dissident group has resources and 1s 
organised for confrontation compared "with the regime, 
14 'the degree to which the regime is unable to keep the groups' 
activities under surveillance, 
15, the lack, of severity and consistency of controls and sanctions 
exerted by the regime, 
i v 
15. the amount of loyalty to the dissident cause among regime 
forces, and 
17. the relative size of the population group supportive of or 
included in the dissenting organisations. 
Gurr adds that where the relative deprivation is more or less limited 
to elites, the form of political action will be that of "conspiracy", 
whereas if the relative deprivation Is a mass phenomenon only, then 
the form of action will more likely be disorganised turmoil. If . 
both elites' and the masses are involved, internal civil war could 
result, if.a number of his other conditions are met. 
Edward Muller^ has tested some of the hypotheses put forward by 
Gurr and simultaneously attempted to verify his own theory of 
potential for Aggressive Political Participation. In considering 
Muller's exposition, we must bear in mind that he tested his 
theoretical formulations in a large German sample which, in terms 
of mean levels of affluence, the extent of political alienation 
and a host of other variables is markedly different from South 
African society. However, his methods were rigorous and we must 
at least assess Gurr's propositions in the light of his findings. 
Muller measured Aggressive Political Participation in terms of the 
declared willingness of his 2 500 subjects to take part in illegal 
strikes, rent and tax boycotts, seizure of buildings, confrontations 
with the police and in the use of violence against the government. 
1) Edward N. Muller, Aggressive Political Participation, Princeton : 
Princeton University Press, 1979. Muller bases his theory on 
the more general behaviour theories of Martin Fishbein, "Attitude 
and the Prediction of Behaviour!' in Ed. M. Fishbein, Readings 
in Attitude Theory and Measurement, New York : Wiley, 1967, pp 477 
492. 
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Once again stated very simply and briefly, his tested propositions, 
which he terms the Expectancy-Value-Norms Theory suggest that 
political aggression 1s the outcome of interaction between: 
1. the extent of a person's belief that political aggression 
has produced benefits and that he or she has the capacity 
to act influentially in political confrontation (Muller 
terns this Utilitarian Justification for Aggression), 
2. the extent of a person's alienation from the political 
system and the degree of his/her radical commitment 
(Normative Justification for Aggression), amounting to 
the extent that a person regards political aggression 
•s justifiable, 
3. the degree of a person's exposure to social norms 
favourable to aggression (Facilitative Social Worms), 
as for example when a person exists in a left-leaning 
radical university conmunity, 
4. the extent to which a person is available for aggressive 
political behaviour 1n terms of age, lack of dependents, 
unemployed, etc. 
These variables 1n Muller's results had the effect of not only 
acting 1n combination, t>ut adding to each others effect (an 
additivity - amplification process). 
In addition, Muller takes account of certain factors which operate 
Indirectly to increase (2) above (Normative Justification for 
Aggression), like 
> 
relative deprivation defined as a belief that one is being 
deprived of one's just deserts, 
dissatisfaction vith political policy at the post-material 
level (i.e. considerations other than material security), 
dissatisfaction with political treatment by the regime, 
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all three of the above factors being influenced by Rank-Disequilibrium, 
i.e. most simply stated as the condition in which say, a person of 
high educational status is accorded a"lower social and occupational 
status. 
Muller then posits certain factors in the macro socio-political 
environment which affect the likelihood of political violence actually 
occurring, namely: 
.5. the weakness of repressive sanctions (repression might exacerbate 
violence 1n the short run but will suppress it in the medium to 
longer terra), 
6. lack of consistency and scope in the limitation of freedoms to 
act and communicate (he terms this the Connunist regime 
variable since these governments are seen by him to be roost 
effectively totalitarian in policy), 
7. the extent of collective or group discrimination or the 
proportion of people excluded from effective political 
participation. 
8. membership and strength of radical organisations, 
9. lade of economic growth or expansion in opportunity (Muller 
concludes it to be a minor variable), and 
10. the lack of effectiveness, flexibility and quality of government 
administration - mainly seen as a lack of capacity to deal 
effectively with threats of political aggression. 
Neither Gurr's theory nor Muller's have been tested in South Africa. 
Given the fact that any society has a unique composition, which 
although not contradicting general rules of behaviour, certainly 
mi9ht indicate that relationships between factors inducing political 
violence vary from society to society, we cannot assume that 
either theory precisely specifies what may happen in South Africa. 
Therefore, it is wisest to consider the relevance of all the factors 
deeroed important by Muller, and not to accept Muller's rejection of the 
13. 
key Inportance of Gurr's relative deprivation as necessarily 
applicable to South Africa. It seems appropriate to take 
account of all the major possible factors enumerated above by 
both Gurr and Huller. 
INDICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
In considering the prospects for widespread or serious political 
upheaval 1n South Africa, we are faced with the difficulty that 
empirical evidence is relatively limited. Where possible we will 
draw on survey research (accepted by both Huller and Gurr as 
const i tut ing valid data) but elsewhere it w i l l be necessary to 
draw tentative conclusions on the basis of impressions. In the 
section which follows we will attempt to combine the list of 
factors of Gurr and Huller, using changed terminology in some 
cases. All the factors enumerated above are Included. 
t 
3.1 Deprivation : Stimulation of Expectations 
Certain of Gurr's variables bearing on relative deprivation 
can be grouped together under the broad heading of the 
stimulation of expectations. Here we have no direct 
empirical data, but we *ust take account of the following 
among blacks: 
the South African economy has experienced quite marked 
cycles of growth. The growth cycles ending in 1974/75 
and 1982 were periods of rapid absorption of blacks into 
better-paid and mare varied and responsible occupations. 
Black wages have grown more rapidly than those of 
whites.1^ In a broad sense these developments must 
stimulate new wants and expectations; 
1) See for example, latest trends diBcussed by Jill Nattrass, 
"Social Change and the South African Economy", in Indicator 
S.A., Ihirban : Centre for Applied Social Sciences, February,: 
1983. 
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furthermore the effect of the pressure of world opinion 
on the S.A. government is to some extent to induce a 
"legitimacy crisiscausing various spokesmen from 
time to time to make vague but sweeping promises of 
reform and development. Here we think of the 
Prime Minister's statement at the top-level and well 
known "Carlton" and "Good Hope" conferences as an 
example. These types of statements also appear to 
produce raised expectations. Empirical evidence 
among a sample of black women has pointed to a 
sensitivity to government statements1^; 
more generally, we must bear in mind that the 
government's policy of separate development is not 
based on a total negation of black political 
aspirations, but attempts to deflect them into 
the semi-autonomous and marginal institutions 
of the "homelands". Therefore, the forms of 
political participation are offered without the 
substance of political access to the central 
decision-making process. This in itself is 
likely to stimulate black political awareness. 
Generally, the environment of South Africa must 
be seen to stimulate political aspirations and 
wants. 
Deprivation : Policy Dissatisfaction and Political Alienation 
Here evidence is available from the large scale attitude 
research undertaken by the Buthelezi Coram'ss ion. ^  The 
1) This effect is implicit in some of the data of the firm Markinor, 
discussed in L. Schlemaer et al., Black Urban Communities, Socio-
political Reform and the Futuret Durban: Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences, 1980. 
^ The Buthelezi Comtission, a commission of enquiry into the 
Political future of KvaZulu and Natal, KwaZulu Government, 
March, 1982 (published by H and H Publications, Durban 1982. 
(See Vol. 1.) An overall sample of 2 630 blacks formed the 
b asis of this report. 
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level of expressed "anger and impatience" or "Diesatisfaction" 
with "life in South Africa" among blacks Is clearly very high, 
and increased rapidly over the five years from 1977 
to 1981. (The findings in the Buthelezi Commission research 
are compared with strictly comparable results for 1977 obtained 
from the Arnold Bergstraesser I n s t i t u t e . T h e results below 
are for the most extreme expression of dissatisfaction - "anger 
and impatience". 
"Anger and Impatience" with "Life in South Africa Today" 
(based on responses to a 5 point verbal cum pictorial scale) 
Hit waters rand, 1977 39% 
All 
JJlack Males 1981 56% 
Witwatersrand 1977 39i 
and KwaZulu, 
Zulu Hen 1«981 53X 
Better educated ' 1977 45% 
Witwatersrand 
and KwaZulu 
Men 1981 68% 
These results tend to speak for themselves. In an earlier study, 
also nation-wide, it appeared that levels of dissatisfaction with 
specifically political and legal conditions and circimstances were 
relatively higher among all groups than dissatisfaction with a 
range of non-political aspects of life, excluding the specific 
issue of incomes*^. In the results of the research for the 
Buthelezi Commission it was clear that the dissatisfaction was 
widespread across social classes and urban and rural regions. 
< 
A rough index of political alienation can be obtained from the 
extent of support for available political institutions. In a 
1) Theodor Hanf et al. op.cit. "Similar samples and the same 
fieldwork team were used. 
2) L. Schlenmer, Research Appendix to the report of the Conmission 
of Enquiry into the Ciskei, The Quail Report, Feb. 1980, 
Pretoria, Conference Associates, 1980. 
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pre-independence referendum held among blacks of Ciskeian 
affiliation, roughly one-third of the total number of people 
who theoretically could have participated did so. In 
Soweto, the percentage polls in elections for the Urban Councils 
dropped from 32 percent in 1968 to 14 percent in 1978. 
The only regions where formal political participation is 
reasonably high are either strictly within the homelands 
(although the latest elections in Bophuthatswana had a low 
poll) or in Natal-KwaZulu, where the political formation of 
Inkatha, under Chief Buthelezi, has created fairly consider-
able political legitimacy. 
In another exploration of political alienation, a full range of 
newspapers for the past year have been perused in order to 
identify statements from black spokesmen that would indicate 
political alienation or loyalty and identification with the 
system. An insignificant number of quotations or reports 
came to hand which indicated positive support for the system, 
no matter how subtly. All statements indicated either highly 
particularistic conmitments, protest, or a complete negation 
of the system. Generally, this aspect of deprivation must be 
counted as indicative of potential instability. 
3 Relative Deprivation or "Just Deserts" Frustration 
In 1972, in a very detailed, semi-depth survey of black 
attitudes in Durban (n 300) qualitative responses were 
classified for evidence of "just deserts" frustration. 
Among blue-collar blacks 39 percent spontaneously provided 
evidence of this particular kind of frustration, and among 
better-educated white-collar blacks the proportion was 45 
percent.1^ In response to more specific items on "just 
deserts" frustration the proportions with this attitudinal 
L. Schlemmer. "Political Adaptation and Reaction among 
Urban Africans in South Africa", Social Dynamics, Vol. 2 
No 1, 1976, pp 3-18. 
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set rose to between 55 and 60 percent. Hence this type 
of relative deprivation is widespread and has quite 
probably increased since 1972. 
V 
For example, in the research for the Buthelezi Commission 
in 1981 more than 90 percent of respondents indicated that 
aspirations to equality with whites were more salient than 
aspirations simply for progress and improvement. 
3.4 Deprivation : low level of Satisfaction of Key rewards and 
Benefits 
The Buthelezi Commission research probed ddslres for reform 
and perceived needs for reform 1n some detail. Education 
emerged consistently as erne of the top three most highly valued 
benefits and also as one of the services most basic to other 
achievements. "The demand for improvement in education was 
also up among the three nost salient requirements. 
Objectively, however, education 1s one of the »ost problematic 
of issues among the spectrum of reforms, Firstly, the ratio 
of expenditure on black versus white education 1s so wide 
(- 1:7 ) that decades will pass before fiscal equality is 
reached. Secondly, black education suffers from a vicious 
circle of deficiencies which mean that improvements in 
quality will be as slow or slower than funding improvements. 
Prospects in this area are negative, despite attempts by the 
government to improve the situation. 
3.5 Deprivation : the Scope and Sharing of Salient Perceived 
Deficiencies 
In a study 1n 1979 of "Quality of Life" among whites, Indians, 
and Blacks in Durban, it has been found that the scope of 
perceived deprivation among blacks compared to other groups 
is dramatically more widespread than the objective differences 
18. 
• in material circumstances would suggest. A certain threshold 
of perceived deprivation on salient issues was taken as standard 
for the three groups. Among blacks the life-concerns above this 
threshold numbered 22, compared with 9 among Indians and 3 among 
whites. The form of the questioning reduced the effects of a 
"complaining ethic" and hence the results are quite disturbing.^ 
Needless to say,the distribution of the results among blacks 
indicates a considerable degree of shared consciousness on this 
issue. 
3.6 Relative Deprivation : the Success of Groups with which Blacks 
can identify 
A few brief points in this regard are sufficient. Blacks 
would.tend to relate themselves particularly to other "non-
white" groups and to blacks in neighbouring territories. 
Nattrass's analysis^ referred to earlier gives some idea of 
the relatively greater socio-economic advances being made by 
coloureds and particularly Indians than blacks. The present 
constitutional proposals for coloureds and Indians are also 
very salient. Furthermore, the "liberation" achieved by 
successive neighbour communities in Mozambique, Angola, 
Zimbabwe and, in the not too distant future, Namibia, 
would suggest that rising political aspirations are quite 
dramatic in our situation. In fact the Buthelezi Commission 
research established that 80 percent or more of blacks sampled 
had a strong, affective identification with events in Zimbabwe. 
Whether these effects will increase, be maintained or decrease 
over time is difficult to say. 
3 . 7 Utilitarian Justification for Aggressive Political Participation 
This aspect has not been adequately covered in the research 
Valerie Miller and Lawrence Schlemmer, "Quality of Life in South 
Africa", Social Indicators Research, forthcoming. 
Jill Nattrass, op, ext. 
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results to hand. Here again, however, the utilitarian 
demonstration-effect of the effects of insurgency in 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique are important. Further-
more, the fact that the government has not been able to 
disguise the fact that it has re-oriented some of its 
policies for black urban areas since the 1976-77 disturbances 
is relevant. There are thus, some very broad indications 
that utilitarian justifications for political aggression 
may exist. 
3.8 Moral Justifications for Political Aggression 
Here we will simply take the results of attitude surveys 
conducted for the Buthelezi Commission as indicative o f a 
climate of normative views. A general indication of the -
'extent of militancy of sentiment in the black population 
appears from the following serifs of results: 
A statement presented to respondents read as follows: 
"It is best for black South Afr>ioan8 to be careful in 
Politics and not get into trouble*' (n 2 600) 
KwaZulu/Natal cities: 
Agree 49% 
Disagree 51% 
Witwatersrand: 
Agree 45% 
Disagree 54% 
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Another item was as follows: 
'If the Government does not introduce changes for blacks in the 
next 10 which of the following do you expect?" (n,2 600+) 
« v 
Rural KwaZulu 
KwaZulu . Natal Cities Witwatersrand 
"Definitely Expect* 
Blacks will be too 
frightened by amy/ 
police to act 21% 9% 17% 
Many more blacks 
will leave country 
for military training 44% 56% 51X 
Mass strikes by 
black workers 60% 651 64% 
BloodsHed/war/revolution 80+% 80+% 80+% 
(spontaneous addition) 
(note: the remarkable figure of 80+ percent in reference to 
bloodshed above must be seen in a context of the build-up of 
suggestion in the previous items.) 
Items which are somewhat closer to attitudinal indices of possible 
behaviour, and not merely sentiment, are reflected in the following 
series. 
Paraphrased versions of items used are as follows: 
"Would black workers strike for two weeks in response to a call 
by a well respected black leader?' (n, 300) 
All KwaZulu/Natal: 
Almost all 20% 
Many 49% 
Only a few 29% 
"If the ANC (insurgents) were to come in secretly asking people 
to help it and work with it.... what would happen?' (n, 300) 
^11 Natal/KwaZulu: 
Most would try to help 19% 
Many would help i t 29% 
A few 29% 
Nobody/almost nobody 8% 
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*Most or many would help the ANC" (first arid second categories 
above. (n, 300) 
Skilled/semi-skilled workers 55% 
"Of people who would not help the ANCt would it be because of 
fear of police or because they disagreed with the ARC?" (n, 300) 
All Natal/KwaZulu: 
These results speak for themselves. There is an abundance of 
attitudinal sentiment supportive of confrontation and political 
aggression. Quite clearly also; the "system" has very little 
legitimacy at the present time and there is a clear orientation 
to an alternative order. 
3.9 Availability for Aggressive Political Participation 
The pattern of unrest in 1976 and subsequently has shown that 
there is a great number of young adults "available", by virtue 
of urban youth unemployment and not infrequent school boycotts 
for public demonstrations or more serious encounters. Hith 
the current downturn in the economy, the relative numbers will 
increase sharply over the next 18 - 24 months. 
Counter-indications are available for the settled labour force, 
however. Although South Africa's incidence of labour-time lost 
through strikes has increased rapidly in recent years,^ the 
short duration and nature of strikes makes it seem that working 
adults are not "available" at this stage for prolonged withdrawal 
from gainful employment. 
All Katal/KwaZulu 
Rural 
Youth: 18-24 yrs 
White collar workers 
48% 
46% 
56% 
56% 
Fear of police 
Disagree with ANC 
60% 
27% 
1) Report of the National Manpower CormrLesion, Government Printer, 
1981. 
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This will be discussed in greater detail presently. It needs 
simply to be noted, however, that in a rapidly-growing population, 
the proportion of more "available" black youths is relatively 
very high. 
3.10 Summary to this point 
So far every indicator chosen has broadly suggested a potential 
for political aggression or violence. The criteria of Huller and 
Gurr not yet discussed all refer to structural and environmental 
factors which can potentially inhibit the manifestation of such 
aggression. These will, finally, be discussed as a group, since 
the political environment in South Africa contains a number of 
overlapping and mutually reinforcing features. 
3.11 Inhibitions in the Environment 
A number of points which cluster round this theme will be made. 
The black organisations likely to espouse and mobilise for 
potential aggression have all been banned and are now located 
externally. The opportunities for mass-mobilisation in South 
Africa are limited. In the current situation most of the 
insurgency which does occur is externally planned and organised. 
In 1979, according to S.A. Broadcasting Corporation reports, 
there were 12 cases of violent insurgency. By 1981 there were 
55, but in 1982 the number appeared to have dropped to roughly 
30 instances,1^ although final records are still not available. 
This is what Gurr would refer to as "conspiracy". 
Thfe correlations with education in the survey data quoted 
above all suggest, in Gurr's terms, a relatively greater discontent 
among the black "elites", an(j therefore a pre-condition for 
conspiracy exists. 
^ See Peter Randal (Ed.) Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 
J o h a n n e s b u r g , South African Institute of Race Relations, 1983, p.230. 
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However, here again a strong inhibitor exists at the present time. 
Police statements over SABC suggest that over 90 percent of under-
ground insurgents who have participated in some act of sabotage 
are tracked down. 
Generally, then, the degree of regime surveillance, control, 
action against radical organisations as well as its motivation 
(its white leadership and substantial white personnel ensures 
loyalty) is sufficient to discourage any organised attempts to 
confront the system. It seems that a build-up of youth 
dissidence and dissident leadership can occur, but here again, 
the regime organisations can contain and ultimately inhibit it. 
This important issue will be discussed further below, but one 
must consider the prospects of unorganised action of a kind 
difficult to control. 
3.11.1 Political Worker Action ( 
One looks, then, at the prospects of what Gurr called "turmoil" 
or disorganised, leaderless violence. A particular focus of 
interest here is that of the potential for labour disturbances. 
The comments already made above on labour disturbances do not 
suggest a strong tendency to violent confrontation among black 
workers, who would be required to support the youth if turmoil 
were to take on threatening proportions. Some people consider 
that the high levels of labour unrest show a tendency in this 
direction. The earlier comments on labour unrest patterns 
would counter-indicate this. 
In 1981, the number of man-days lost in strikes was roughly 190 
per 1 000 black employees.^ Comparing this with other countries 
' for 1979, shows th£t the black strike incidence in South Africa 
is well below the incidence in the UK, USA, Australia, Canada, 
Italy, Isreal and other countries in which the econocny is highly 
2) 
strike prone. ' • 
1) Report of the National Manpower Conmission, op.cit. 
2) See 19SO Yearbook on Labour Statistics, International Labour 
Organisation, Geneva. 
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The pattern for the first six months of 1982, as given by the 
Minister of Manpower in parliament, shows a slight increase 
in numbers in 1982 but a decrease in the time taken to resolve 
strikes.^ 
the pattern of black strike activity over the past years appears 
worth noting. . After years of very low activity there was a 
sharp increase in 1973 and 1974, in response to inflation, 
declining real income and poor communication in industry. The 
ensuing years from 1975 to 1979 once again represented a period 
of very low labour unrest. In 1980, after the new labour 
legislation had led to a spurt in union activity and worker 
mobilisation,strike action increased cmce again quite sharply 
until 1982. It was then probably slightly above the average 
levels for 1973 and 1974. This year, C1983) the general 
impression 1s that it has declined again quite sharply in response 
to the economic recession. 
One must conclude that strike activity tends to be cyclical in 
response to organisational, legislative and econooic factors. 
There does not seen to be any burgeoning of labour instability 
as a consequence of political factors of a direct kind. The 
official classification of causes of strike activity bear this 
out - political causes are not mentioned at all. 
There are a few considerations in regard to the effect of politics 
on labour instability which deserve mention, however. An analysis 
of regional patterns of labour unrest shows that the Eastern Cape 
is dramatically over-represented as regards labour unrest relative 
2) 
to employment numbers. 
See Randall, op. ext., p.184. 
National Manpower Commission, op. cit.t p. 224. 
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There is no logical reason for this other than the well-known 
fact that blacks in the Eastern Cape tend to exhibit a higher 
degree of political militancy than elsewhere. It would seem 
that political consciousness interacts with other factors in 
labour relations (grievances, wage rates, etc.) - possibly as 
a catalyst - in determining the level of strike-proneness, . 
without the strikers necessarily having overt political 
objectives. 
Secondly, the wave of strikes about pensions in late 1982, 
reflected among other factors a lack of trust in government 
end its intentions as regards the handling of workers' pension 
contributions and benefits.1^ Here, one may argue, is a case 
of the low political legitimacy of the key institutions in the 
system inducing a heightened instability among members of the ' 
black labour force. i 
We appear to have evidence, then, of a political factor in labour 
unrest. However, this does not represent political unrest in 
the black labour force as such. There is still little or no 
activity on the labour front which Gurr would regard as signs 
of incipient turmoil. 
Black attitudes to trade unionism seem to support the conclusion 
above. When asked what trade unions could do for blacks, fewer 
than 5 percent of respondents mentioned a political function or 
5oal (n, 700, 1981). Labour is not seen in a political light. 
Blacks may be relatively highly politicised and have quite well-
developed militant sentiments, but there is still a very clear 
tendency for the political and labour spheres to be separated 
in the collective thinking of the black labour force. 
i') L. Schlenmer and L. van Schalkvyk, The Tensions Strikes, Durban, 
Centre for Applied Social Sciences, (forthcoming). 
26. 
One can argue that this separation of spheres may not continue. 
Apart from the examples of interaction between political and 
labour action given above, there are also examples of boycotts 
of products in solidarity with aggrieved workers. -The well-
known Fattis and Monis boycott and the meat boycotts of a few 
years ago were cases in point. 
These consumer-boycotts reflected a new development of some 
import which deserves further analysis, but they cannot be 
classified as the kind of political action which Gurr 1s 
referring to, and therefore do not seen to add up to a "political 
deetabilieation" of the labour force. 
There is thus very little direct indication of a growth of 
directly politically Inspired activisa in the mass of black labour. 
This, as we see, is in large measure due to the separation of 
employment and political issues. If ever the separation of 
spheres were to be bridged, it would introduce political activism 
right into a domain where blacks have real bargaining power, with 
quite dramatic consequences. 
.2 Coercion and Fear 
In part the caution exhibited by blacks which is clear from the 
preceding section,is a fear reaction. The security apparatus 
in South Africa and its activities have a powerful "demonstration" 
. effect on people. It is well-known inside and outside South 
Africa that thousands of people over the years have been detained 
without trial in terms of security legislation. Furthermore, 
the occurrence of deaths in detention are well-pub!icised and 
quite understandably create a climate of fear among would-be 
political activists. 
• The pattern of security action over the years is difficult to 
monitor since information is often inconsistent or unsystematic. 
Generally-speaking, however, it would not seem that there is a 
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current increase in the numbers of people affected by security 
action. If one takes political detentions, with or without 
trials, as one index,the following pattern emerges, based on 
statistics kept by the South African Institute of Race Relations 
1) 
and the South African Council of Churches. ' 
1980 (up to November) 956 people 
1981 (up to November) 630 people 
1982 (up to November) 264-310* people 
(* Figures given by the Minister of Police were higher.) 
The apparent decline in security action does not necessarily 
reflect a more tolerant approach, nor does, it necessarily show 
less politically-motivated discontent. The lower figures 
f6r 1982 could be the result of the affect of previous 
detentions aod deaths in detention. 
By the standards of totalitarian regimes, the figures for 
political detentions are not high in a population of 25 million 
people. Possibly, however, the fear of detention and its 
consequences and the image of efficiency which the South African 
regime probably enjoys (relative to the regimes of less-
developed totalitarian societies) may have the effect of 
inducing great caution. Nevertheless, the level of security 
control is not such as to suggest that it is the only factor 
constraining the black population of South Africa. 
1.11.3 Dual Consciousness 
There is, in addition to the fear-coercion factor, considerable 
evidence of certain kinds of political ambivalence among the 
black people of South Africa. 
[) See Annual Survey of Face Relations in South Africa, 1980, 1981, 
1982, Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations. 
Figures include the independent homelands. 
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The research for the Buthelezi Commission and the Quail Commission, 
referred to earlier, have shown that, despite the high levels of 
nilltancy, discontent and frustration evidenced in the findings, 
the minimum political demands, in policy-terms, of a wide cross-
section of blacks are surprisingly moderate. Broadly, one can 
say that 60 to 70 percent of blacks declare themselves prepared 
to accept socio-political arrangements which amount to substantial 
compromises with white interests. In particular, majorities of 
blacks are willing to accept *consociational* arrangements in 
which whites would have equal power with blacks in a future 
dispensation. 
More pertinent to this topic, however, are the following results 
of a separate study among 150 black adults in Durban in 1979, 
which in part was devoted to an explanation of more "rational" 
considerations of strategy. The following examples are relevant: 
Percentage endorsement of alternative-choice statements 
relating to black political strategy (Zulu men, n 150). 
(Statements are paraphrased, uncertain responses oaitted.) 
'A leader must act strongly to win support 22% 
V8 
Be should wait in order to form a strong 
organisation." 
76% 
"A black leader should never co-operate with 
the government 
vs 
Be should criticise, but co-operate where 
beneficial. * 85* 
11% 
' "Being patient does not help, a leader must 
make strong demands now 
V8 
Be must be patient and work with the tools he 61% 
30% 
has." 
"There is no longer anything to be gained by 
being patient • • 
vs 
19% 
It still pays to be patient and plan carefully 81% 
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"Some people say that overseas companies should stop buying 
South African goods and stop sending money to build factories 
so as to frighten the South African government into getting 
rid of apartheid. Others say they should continue because 
it makes jobs for all people in South Africa.'' 
• Stop (boycott/disinvestment) 20% 
• Continue trading/investing 75% 
• Oont know 5% 
Even among the most militant-group of ''black consciousness" 
supporters, no more than 33 percent of respondents advocated 
the disinvestment strategy. 
If we add to these results the fact that the Buthelezi Commission 
findings showed that 70 percent or more blacks not only would 
oppose discrimination against whites, but also indicated that they 
valued white participation in South African society,^ then 
a complex picture emerges, along broadly the following lines. 
Blacks are highly discontented, with an attitudinal potential 
for political aggression. At the same time the consistency 
and pervasiveness of the web of white control inhibits this 
orientation from coming to the fore. This inhibition is also 
secured by the constraints on leadership. 
At the same time, however, it is clear that certain advantages 
are recognised in living with the system. Clearly, the capacity 
of the South African economy to generate employment and to 
create expanding material prospects is one important factor 
2) 
emerging from these results. ' 
a 
Furthermore, the attitudenal results seem to indicate that the 
"system" may not be perceived as totally inflexible. There appears 
to be a feeling that patience, negotiation and the building-up of 
bargaining power will lead to reforms and concessions granted 
peacefully. 
) The Buthelezi Commission, vol. 1. op. cit. 
) The figures of Jill Nattrass given earlier on the increasing share 
of income enjoyed by blacks are relevant here. 
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In other words, substantial proportions of black rank-and-file 
people seem to feel able to maintain a practical approach to 
political behaviour. 
Furthermore, the responses of whites.in the system are also 
sufficiently varied to prevent a rigid stereotyping of the 
"enemy". There is also (from results not quoted) some 
indication among blacks of an appreciation of the value of 
white technological expertise. 
What is perhaps most important among these factors, is that 
despite the government's determination not to yield to pressures 
for black constitutional reform, a perception seems to exist 
among blacks that not all non-violent options are closed. This 
attitude is very closely related to one of the conditions which 
Gurr mentions as counter-acting the effects of relative 
deprivation - the perception of opportunities for incremental 
gains. 
Therefore, there appears to be a dual-consciousness among blacks 
of a kind which counteracts the attitudes of discontent and 
concepts of violent political strategy which so many observers 
of South African society would expect. 
4. CONCLUSIONS: THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF DRAMATIC CHANGE OR CONFLICT 
What has been referred to as a dual-consciousness is probably the 
most important factor bearing upon the relative stability at the 
present time. However, this consciousness is the outcome, in part, 
of a particular configuration of structures and forms of organisation 
in South African society. It is these structures which have to be 
appreciated in order to understand the failure of violent 
revolution in the society. 
We have seen that in terms of both Gurr's and Muller's attitudinal 
end normative factors, virtually all the preconditions for an 
escalation of political violenpe appear to exist. The implications 
of the results on various indexes given in this paper are obvious 
and need not be summarised here. 
On the other hand, Gurr's structural and organisational criteria 
for revolution or for *turmoil"civil war" or effective 
*conspiracy" among political leader figures inside South Africa 
are not ®et. 
In the past two-and-a-half decades two successive waves of political 
violence have failed to fully extend the forces -of law and order, 
let alone threaten the survival of the regime. While there have 
been responses to the violence in the form of policy adaptations 
and reform, the efforts have been ^luggish or unhurried and the 
effects undramatic. The "Soweto" disturbances have yielded 
certain improvements in conditions for blacks in urban areas (the 
99 year leasehold system, giving security of housing tenure; an 
increase in the rate of building of classrooms) but these effects 
fall far short of what could be called structural change. Hence, 
a collective and widespread belief that violence will have practical 
benefits simply has not developed. This is one of Gurr's major 
criteria. 
Turning to Gurr's other collective criteria, we may note that there 
is also no loyalty to the dissident cause among regime forces, 
that security and surveillance controls are very consistent and 
have demonstrated their severity, particularly in past years, 
and that virtually no internal dissident organisation capable of 
operating sufficiently openly to sanction, reward or encourage 
yiolence exists or is able to exist for very long. Here we 
have to take account of a particularly complex and multi-facetted 
set of controls over political communication and over the activities 
of organisations and their funding. Inkatha^ has the organisation 
perhaps, but does not support violence. 
1) Inkatha now has membership of some 750 OOO and is therefore the 
largest black political organisation. 
The picture, broadly, 1s consistent with the propositions of Gurr 
and with predictions which could be made on the basis of his 
propositions. The general conclusion would be that political 
discontent among blacks is constrained by coercion and control 
(or by the consequences of coercion) and that as a consequence a 
certain degree of pragmatisa is forced upon the black population. 
This conclusion Is valid, but it is not the whole picture, as it 
were. Muller includes among his organisational factors one which 
can be elaborated to provide a particular insight into black responses 
in South Africa. 
Muller speaks of the effectiveness, quality and flexibility of 
administration as a factor discouraging the build-up of political 
aggression. This factor can be broadened, and seen as a 
generalised responsiveness (apparent or real) in the system. In 
South Africa this has various components. 
Firstly, we have noted the capacity of the economy to generate 
incremental rewards, and to respond to pressures of various kinds 
for an improvement in levels of material welfare. Not only are 
Nattrass'$ figures relevant again, but various (very recent) 
government attempts to improve housing provision and educational 
services for blacks are also relevant, as are steady, albeit cautious, 
moves towards the desegregation of more and more facilities. 
Secondly, in part as a consequence of the policy of separate 
development and the decentralisation of functions to marginal 
(black) authorities, a very large number of better-educated 
black people are absorbed into senior bureaucratic and 
administrative positions in the state system. Even in the 
police force, there are over 75 black commissioned officers. 
If one adds all these positions together, it would amount to 
the effective co-optation of thousands of better-educated blacks. 
If one adds to these the numbers of black incumbents at similar 
levels in the private sector, it is clear that there is a 
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considerable drain of talent away from the revolutionary cause, 
as it were. 
One can make this point notwithstanding the fact that there is 
still massive inequality in the relative occupational advancement 
of blacks and whites. All that is suggested here is that the 
system is seen to generate occupational opportunity. 
A third factor in this regard is the fact that the admini strati on 
of black affairs is becoming more and more sophisticated. Particularly 
since the 1976 disturbances, administrators of high quality have 
been put in charge of the larger black urban communities. Currently, 
although there is legislation pending which may make influx control 
to the cities and in the cities more rigid, there is also new 
legislation to create, and fund, a much more legitimate system of 
black local government.^ It is not claimed here that all the myriad 
frustrations and restrictions for black people in South Africa are 
being removed. What is happening is simply that changes and shifts 
do occur, and while they are inadequate in objective, quantitative 
terms, they create the impression of flexibility or impending change 
in the system. ' 
Finally in this regard, South Africa has one characteristic which 
most authoritarian regimes do not have — a fairly intense debate 
about social change in the mass media. This probably has a double 
effect in raising hopes and expectations but at the same time creating 
a running impression of the potential for change and reform in the 
system. Whatever the real flexibility of the system may or may not 
be, the mass media and public debates certainly create an impression 
of possibilities. 
« 
This real or apparent system responsiveness, coupled with effective -
security controls and an emasculation of counter-system organisation, 
is likely to continue to protect the established regime functions, 
at least in the short term. 
) Black Local Authorities Act no. 102 of 1982. Details of funding are 
not yet knovm but the Minister of Cooperation and Development 
has indicated that it vill be a substantial improvement on present 
funding. 
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5. THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 
Does this conclusion mean that South Africa will be a peaceful 
society in the longer-term as the 20th century draws to an end? 
Not at all. It will probably be a-relatively stable order, but 
the stability of its production and administrative systems is 
likely to co-exist with a level of contained violence emanating 
from expatriate organisations like the ANC . and sporadic popular 
disturbances. 
The reasons for this contradiction lie in the fact that South Afri 
is as yet far froo being a fully-developed society, and large numb 
of black people will not be included in the economic system and in 
the network of services and facilities. Here one thinks particul 
of the unemployed youth, whose educational level is rapidly increa 
along with their expectations and aspirations.^ Furthermore, am 
youthful migrant workers who are unemployed, the rapidly increasin 
density of settlement in the black rural areas means that more and 
more are deprived of the alternative security of subsistence 
2) 
agriculture on small allotments in traditional areas. 1 
It 1s from these categories of people that one may expect a steady 
stream of economic, if not political, "refugees" to leave South Af 
to receive insurgency training abroad. The current and likely fu 
ability of South African forces to destroy insurgent bases in 
neighbourhood territories will probably curtail the ease of return 
of the trained insurgents, but the current pattern of regular but 
limited sabotage will continue. As the technology of insurgency 
and the levels of training improve, the sabotage is likely to beea 
more serious in its effects. We must bear in mind, however, tha 
many societies have demonstrated a capacity to accommodate fairly 
high levels of sabotage and insurgency for long periods. Sabotag 
in itself does not topple governments. 
1) Sixty percent of black unemployment is among people under 30 years 
of age: The current Population Survey of Department of Statistics, 
1982. 
2) See The Buthelezi Ccmrriasion, op. cit., p. 235 for details of rura 
resources of samples of blacks in KwaZulu. 
The effects of sustained or moderately increased sabotage will be 
complex. On the one hand, sabotage probably has a politicising and 
morale-boasting effect on substantial proportions of the black 
community. Given the system of control and the dual consciousness 
of the nass of economically active blacks, however, it is unlikely 
to encourage open action. It may even be perceived as an excuse 
for non-involvement in political activity inside South Africa. 
The effects on whites, provided it does not reduce confidence in 
the economy, which it has not done up to now, will probably be to 
increase solidarity and to rally support for the government. 
These speculations presuppose that insurgency will be contained 
below a certain threshold of effect on the economy and costs of 
containment. In a very real sense, the future of South Africa is 
dependent on the contest between insurgency action and the capacity 
of the state to contain it below a ,critical threshold. The nature 
of the overall political system as it has been analysed in this 
paper would suggest that, apart from counter-insurgency techniques 
and strategies, a solution to the problem of black youth unemployment 
is the »ost critical factor. The government is certainly aware of 
this and new schemes for the training of unemployed blacks have 
recently been launched. The task is daunting, however, since 
the economy has developed a tendency to capital intensity. 
One uncertainty relates to the possibility of a politicisation of 
labour action (or related consumer action). The scenario above has 
been sketched on the assumption that blacks will continue to separate 
the political from the labour and consumer spheres. If not, investor 
confidence will be affected, and this confidence is the key to 
South Africa's stability. A breakdown in business confidence will 
produce a vicious cycle of declining capacity to cope with problems — 
increased recruitment for insurgency (through increased youth 
unemployment), lessened capacity to deal with it, leading to even 
lower business confidence, and so on. There is, at this stage, 
however, no indication of such a process occurring. 
i i ^ g § s j-- • • 
Given the constellation of factors outlined in this paper, and 
provided the assumptions and observations in the analysis are 
valid, the best future for the current regime in South Africa is 
t 
likely to be one of cycles of black youth unrest and a persisting 
level of insurgency and sabotage. The former will be contained, 
as before. The latter factor, the level of insurgency, defies 
prediction. 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
